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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARK BAMBROUGH, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
RAY BETHERS, dba 
Ray Bethers Trucking, 
and DANNY SHIMIZU, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 14320 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff claimed the defendants' negligence caused 
him personal injuries. Defendants claim plaintiff was an 
employee of the defendant Bethers and/or in the same employment 
with both defendants for purposes of the Utah Workmens 
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Compensation statutes, and that Workmens Compensation 
was plaintiff's exclusive remedy. Pursuant to stipulation 
of the parties, issues raised by these defenses were tried 
separately from questions of liability and damage. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The employment issues relevant to the Workmens 
Compensation defenses were tried before a jury on a special 
verdict. Based upon the jury's responses to the propositions 
set forth in the special verdict, the court entered a 
Judgment of Dismissal dated September 25, 19 75 (R. 6-7). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants pray that the trial court judgment 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 15, 1973 the plaintiff drove a 
tractor and trailer owned by D & L Corporation onto the 
defendant Bethers business premises to deliver a load of 
wood paneling to Denver, Colorado(R-284). The load plaintiff 
was to deliver had to be transferred from a trailer owned by 
the defendant Bethers and onto the trailer owned by D & L 
(R-252). 
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2. Prior to the time plaintiff arrived, the 
defendant Bethers then dispatcher, Clair Anderson, called 
the owner of D & L Corporation, and made verbal arrangements 
that D & L would trip lease its truck and trailer to Bethers 
for the trip to Colorado (R-207-208). Mr. Anderson recalls 
discussing the trip lease with plaintiff (R-238), although 
Bambrough denies recollection of any such discussion (R-2 86). 
3. Clair Anderson testified he prepared part, 
but not all, of a trip lease for the load plaintiff was to 
transport on the date of the accident (R-211-213). He 
indicated he signed that lease in the blocks marked "signature 
of inspector" and "signature for certification" on the date 
plaintiff was injured (R-213). The signature by Anderson 
in the block marked receipt by Carrier (Lessee) was not 
written in until late 1974 or early 1975 (R-213-214). The 
trip lease was not signed by the plaintiff, but was signed 
by Bud Jolley, the replacement driver hired by D & L who 
actually delivered the load, after plaintiff was injured 
(R-246-248)• 
4. When plaintiff arrived with the D & L truck 
and trailer on the defendant Bethers1 business premises, 
he was told by Bethers1 personnel to assist in transferring 
the load. (R-301). When plaintiff learned that the load was 
-3-
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to be transferred he telephoned Mr. Leftwich of D & L 
for instructions. Leftwich told him: "If that's their 
procedure you do it." (R-302). Thereafter plaintiff 
and the defendant Shimizu proceeded to transfer the load 
from the trailer owned by the defendant Bethers and on 
to the trailer owned by D & L. 
5. Approximately an hour and a half elapsed 
from the time plaintiff and the defendant Shimizu began 
transferring the load until the plaintiff was injured 
(R-305). No one else worked with them (Id.). 
6. Shimizu and plaintiff worked together to 
transfer the load (R-292). In effectuating the transfer 
Shimizu would pick up the bundles of wood products with a 
forklift, while plaintiff would pick up 2" X 4" pieces of 
wood ("stickers") which would be placed under the bundles 
on the D & L owned trailer. Shimizu would pick up a bundle 
with the forklift and plaintiff would take "stickers" from 
the Bethers trailer or yard and set them on the load 
Shimizu was carrying. When the forklift moved next to the 
D & L owned trailer, plaintiff would take the "stickers" 
off the bundle and set them on the trailer deck so that 
the bundles could be placed on the "stickers" (R-30 3). 
7. A short time prior to the accident, the tarps 
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to cover the load were placed on the forklift and an 
attempt was made to unload the tarps on the top of the 
load* When the tarps wouldn't come off the forks, 
plaintiff climbed onto the Bethers1 forklift to push 
the tarps off (R-291). 
8. Although plaintiff and Shimizu had loaded 
the wood products on D & L owned vehicle at the time of 
the accident, the tarps on the load had not been fastened 
to the trailer prior to plaintifffs injury (R-308). After 
the injury the D & L replacement driver, Bud Jolley, had 
to finish tarping the load and to tie it down, (R-246). 
9. Immediately prior to the accident and before 
he had tied down the tarps, plaintiff mounted the running 
board of the Bethers forklift, probably to tell the defendant 
"Thanks for helping me to load," and to inform Shimizu to 
"tell Ray [Bethers] that on the way back I will drop his 
tarps off." (R-292). 
10. At trial the plaintiff did not object to the 
Court giving proposition, no. 4 to the jury which read: 
"At the time and place of the injury to 
Clark Bambrough, Clark Bambrough and Danny 
Shimizu were engaged in the same line of work 
and labor [ed] together and in such personal 
relations that they could exercise an influence 
upon each other promotive of proper caution 
in respect to their mutual safety and they were at 
the time of the injury directly operating with 
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each other in the business at hand, or they 
were operating so that mutual duties brought 
them into such co-association that they could 
exercise an influence upon each other to 
use proper caution and be so.situated in their 
labor as to be able to supervise and watch 
the conduct of each other as to skill, diligence 
and carefulness." (R-30). 
11. The trial jury answered proposition no. 4 
in the affirmative. 
12. On January 15, 1973 the defendant Shimizu 
was an employee of the defendant Bethers (R-251-252). 
13. After the accident of January 15, 19 7 3 
plaintiff received Workmens Compensation benefits (Bambrough 
Dep. p. 48). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN PROPOSITION 4 OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT THE 
TRIAL JURY FOUND FACTS TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT 
PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANTS WERE IN THE "SAME EMPLOYMENT" 
FOR WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PURPOSES. SINCE PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE SUBMISSION OF PROPOSITION 4 TO 
THE JURY AND SINCE COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE 
JURY'S FINDINGS ON THAT ISSUE, THE TRIAI< COURT JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
At the time of plaintiff's injury Section 35-1-62 
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provided: 
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"When any injury or death for which 
compensation is payable under this title 
shall have been caused by the wrongful act 
or neglect of another person not in the same 
employment, the injured employee, or in the case 
of death his dependents, may claim compensation 
and the injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representatives may also have an action for 
damages against such third person." (emphasis 
added). 
In 1975 this statute was amended, but it contained 
the language cited in the previous paragraph at the time 
of plaintiff's accident. See Section 35-1-62, Utah 
Code Annotated (Supp. 1975) . 
This Court has noted that "same employment" does 
not require that the injured person be hired or paid by 
a defendant in order for the injured person to be in the 
same employment with that defendant. In Peterson v. Fowler, 
27 Utah 2d 159, 164, 493 P.2d 997, 1000 (1973) this 
court held: 
" . . . 'Same Employment' as used in 
our Workmen's Compensation Act means work 
of the same general type and nature as that 
concurrently being performed by the defendant 
or its employees." (emphasis added). 
In that same decision this court also set forth 
the standard by which a trier of fact might determine whether 
persons were in the same employment for Workmen's Compensation 
purposes: 
-7-
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"To be fellow servants, they must be 
engaged in the same line of work and labor 
together in such personal relations that they 
can exercise an influence upon each other 
promotive of proper caution in respect of their 
mutual safety. They should be at the time of 
the injury directly operating with each other 
in the particular business at hand, or they must 
be operating so that mutual duties bring them 
into such co-asociation that they may exercise 
an influence upon each other to use proper 
caution and be so situated in their labor to 
some extent as to be able to supervise and watch 
the conduct of each other as to skill, diligence 
and carefulness. When workmen are so engaged, 
we think they are working in the same employment." 
Id. at 164, 493 P.2d at 1000. (emphasis added). 
In the Peterson decision the decedent's estate 
sought to sue a subcontractor for plaintiff's alleged wrongful 
death. The decedent was hired by the general contractor, but 
also did work for the subcontractor. At the completion of the 
work the subcontractor was to reimburse the general contractor 
for services rendered the subcontractor by the deceased. It 
was unclear at the time of the decedent's death exactly what 
work the decedent was performing. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of the 
subcontractor-respondent: 
"In the instant case if at the time of the 
accident the deceased was applying tile on 
behalf of the respondent. . .he would be an 
employee and plaintiffs could not maintain the 
action. On the other hand, if at the time of the 
accident he was cleaning beams and hubs on behalf 
of the general contractor, the plaintiffs couM 
not maintain the action because he was engaged in 
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the same employment as the employees of the 
respondent." Peterson, supra, at 165, 493 P.2d 
at 1001. 
This court went on to note that the plaintiff had 
the burden of showing that the decedent was neither employed 
by nor in the same employment with the respondent. Id. 
In proposition no. 4 of the special verdict the 
jury was asked to find whether or not the plaintiff and 
the defendant Shimizu were engaged in the same line of work, 
laboring together so that they could influence each other 
with respect to their mutual safety and situated so as to 
supervise and watch the skill, diligence and care of the 
other at the time of the accident. The essential factual 
elements of the Peterson test were thus submitted to them. 
The jury found as true the factual bases set forth by this 
court in the Peterson decision, and respondents respectfully 
submit that the legal conclusion required by the jury 
finding on proposition no. 4 is that plaintiff and the 
defendants were in the "same employment" pursuant to 
Section 31-1-62 as it existed at the time of the injury. 
Plaintiff did not object to proposition no. 4 
being submitted to the jury (R-328). 
-9-
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i 
Furthermore, the evidence presented provided 
a legitimate basis for the jury's finding. It was , 
undisputed that the defendant Shimizu was employed by the 
defendant Bethers. Both Bethers and D & L Corporation 
were in the trucking business. At the time of the
 { 
accident plaintiff and Shimizu were working together on 
a common project, namely the transfer of the wood products 
from the Bethers owned vehicle to the D & L vehicle. They
 { 
had worked together on that project for about an hour 
and a half and plaintiff admits that when he voluntarily 
boarded the forklift immediately prior to the accident
 { 
he probably told Shimizu "Thanks for helping me to load." 
(R-292). 
While they were working together, plaintiff from 
time to time would make suggestions to Shimizu on how to 
align the load (R-302-303). After the wood products 
had been placed on the trailer Bambrough had driven, he 
and Shimizu worked together to have the covering tarps 
lifted upon the load. And when the tarps would not come 
off the forks, plaintiff climbed onto the forklift Shimizu 
was operating to push the tarps off the load. And plaintiff 
says he probably mentioned return of the tarps to Shimizu 
just prior to the accident. (R-292). 
-10-
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These foregoing facts provide a credible basis 
for the finding that the two did work together at the 
time of the accident in such a manner as to make 
plaintiff and defendants in the same employment for 
Workmens Compensation purposes. 
Indeed, even if plaintiff were correct in 
arguing that the trial court erred in submitting 
propositions 1, 2 and 3 (and defendants do not contend 
that any such error was committed), the jury finding on 
proposition no* 4, conclusively establishes a factual 
basis for holding that plaintiff and defendants were in 
the same employment. This finding would provide an 
independent basis for the trial court's judgment of 
dismissal even if the trial court had erred in submitting 
to the jury the propositions on whether plaintiff was 
an employee of the defendant Bethers. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDING THAT WORKMENS COMPENSATION WAS PLAINTIFF'S 
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
SUBMITTING PROPOSITION 1 TO THE JURY ON A SPECIAL VERDICT. 
-11-
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A portion of Section 35-1-60 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"Exclusive remedy against employer, or 
officer, agent or employee-occupational disease 
excepted. The right to recover compensation 
pursuant to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether 
resulting in death or not, shall be the 
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent 
or employee of the employer and the liability 
of the employer imposed by this act shall be 
in place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such 
employee . • ., on account of any accident 
or injury or death, in any way contracted, 
sustained, aggravated or incurred by such 
employee in the course of or because of or 
arising out of his employment, and no action 
at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent or employee of the 
employer based upon any accident, injury or death 
of an employee . . . " 
The language of the statute is clear and cases 
interpreting this section have often held that the Workmens 
Compensation remedy is exclusive insofar as a claim by an 
employee against an employer or his employee is concerned• 
e.g. Peterson v. Fowler, supra. Of course, the crucial 
question is whether there was sufficient evidence for the 
trial court to find that plaintiff was Bethers1 employee for 
Workmens Compensation purposes at the time of the accident. 
Section 35-1-42 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides in part: 
-12-
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"Employers enumerated and defined -
Regularly employed - Independent contractors. 
The following shall constitute employers 
subject to the provisions of this title: 
(2). . . 
Where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision and control, 
and such work is a part or process in the trade 
or business of the employer, such contractor, and 
all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors 
under him, and all persons employed by any such 
subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning 
of this section, employees of such original 
employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged 
in the performance of work as an independent 
contractor shall be deemed an employer within the 
meaning of this section. The term "independent 
contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any 
person, association or corporation engaged in the 
performance of any work for another, who, while so 
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject 
to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged 
only in the performance of a definite job or piece 
of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in 
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's 
design." (emphasis supplied except for emphasis in 
title). 
From a reading of the statute it appears that two 
major conditions must be met for an employee of a contractor 
or subcontractor to be employees of the original employer. 
First, the employer is to retain supervision and control over 
the work of the subcontractor. Second, the work of the 
subcontractor must be a part or process of the business of 
the employer, On the supervision and control issue, it is 
-13-
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clear that the right of control is the determinative 
condition, regardless of whether that right is actually 
exercised or not. Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 
Utah 309, 313-314, 172 P.2d 136 (1946); Utah Fire & Clay 
Company v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 1, 2, 40 P.2d 183, 
186 (1935). See also Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 
34, 442 P.2d 31, 34 (1968). 
,/ With respect to the first precondition, namely 
the right of Bethers to control plaintiff's working actions 
at the time of the accident, the trial jury specifically found 
that Bethers had that right of control. (R-29). Although 
plaintiff claims he never specifically consented to be 
Bethers employee, the record contains evidence that D & L 
Corporation did recognize Bethers1 right to control plaintiff 
and consented to the exercise of that control. Plaintiff 
testified that when he was informed that the load would have 
to be transferred onto the vehicle owned by D & L, he called 
Mr. Leftwich of D & L and asked what he should do. (R-302). 
Plaintiff indicated Leftwich told him: "If that is their 
procedure you do it." (Id.). A clearer manifestation of 
D & L's acknowledgement and authorization of Bethers1 right 
to control plaintiff during the loading and operation of the 
trailer is difficult to imagine. 
-14-
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It should be noted that plaintiff commenced 
working with Shimizu to effectuate the load transfer 
at a time designated by Bethers' employees. (R-300). 
Neither plaintiff nor D & L unilaterally determined 
when, how or in what manner the wood products would be 
loaded* Plaintiff indicated he balked when Bethers' 
personnel indicated the load would be transferred, but 
when he called Mr* Leftwich of D & L about that matter, 
Leftwich in effect told him that if Bethers wanted him 
to assist in transferring the load he should do it. 
(R-302). 
Regardless of whether plaintiff himself knew 
he was or consented to be an employee of defendant Bethers 
for Workmens Compensation purposes, there is credible 
evidence that D & L Corporation recognized Bethers right 
to control plaintiff's working actions in a project duly 
contracted between D & L and Bethers. D & L and Bethers 
appear to have been in the trucking business, and D & L 
agreed, at least orally, to lease its equipment to 
Bethers for the Colorado delivery (R-207-208). 
In a number of cases involving rather similar facts 
-15-
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to those involved in this lawsuit the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that persons not actually hired by a defendant, might 
still be his employees for Workmens Compensation purposes if 
he had the right to control their work and they were engaged 
in the work of the employer at the time of the accident. In 
Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Company, 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 
616 (1963), the plaintiff was hired by Coker Contruction 
Company as a miner to work on a diversion tunnel. The court 
found that Coker and the defendant Kiewit had contracted with 
each other to join their efforts in constructing the tunnel 
and share profits or losses from the enterprise. Apparently, 
plaintiff worked rather closely with Kiewit employees and was 
directed where to drill his jackhammer by Kiewit engineers. 
The Supreme Court reversed a lower court denial of 
Kiewit's motion for summary judgment, and held that Coker and 
Kiewit, having agreed to join in the construction of the tunnel 
and to share profits, became partners and the two companies 
( 
were regarded as the employing unit. 15 Utah 2d at 23, 386 
P.2d at 617-618. The court held that employees of both 
companies would be considered as engaged in the same employment 
and that Workmens Compensation was plaintiff's exclusive 
remedy. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment 
should have been granted. 
% i 
-16-
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In Smith v. Alfred Brown Company, 27 Utah 2d 155, 
493 P.2d 994 (1972), plaintiff, hired as a brickmason by a 
subcontractor of the defendant, sued the defendant general 
contractor for personal injuries suffered in a fall on the 
construction project. The agreement between the general 
contractor and the subcontractor provided generally that 
the subcontractor was to promptly and diligently prosecute 
the work when it became available or at such other times 
as the contractor should direct. 
In affirming a trial court award of summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant general contractor the Supreme 
Court held: 
". . .the trial court was justified in 
viewing the situation thus: that the defendant 
general contractor Brown had sufficient super-
vision and control over the 'subcontractors under 
him1 [i.e. Ashton] that 'all persons employed by 
any such subcontractor1 [i.e. plaintiff Smith] 
should be deemed an employee of the general 
contractor [defendant Brown] and that consequently 
the plaintiff would be covered by workmen's 
compensation as an employee of the latter and 
thus precluded from maintaining this suit. 
Accordingly the summary judgment was properly 
granted." (Id. at 158-159, 483 P.2d at 996.) 
And in Adamson v. Okland Construction Company, 29 
Utah 2d 286, 509 P.2d 805 (1973), the Supreme Court affirmed 
a summary judgment in favor of a defendant general contractor. 
In that case it appeared that the general contractor had the 
-17-
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right to take over the work of an electrical sub-
contractor (who employed the decedent) if in the general 
contractor's opinion the subcontractor did not proceed 
satisfactorily with its work. The general contractor 
had the right to direct work sequence by the sub-
constractors, to make changes in work done by them and 
to order work stoppages. This overall supervisory 
right was sufficient to make the decedent an employee 
of the general contractor for Workmens Compensation 
purposes. Okland Construction, supra at 289-290, 508 
P.2d at 807-808. In that decision the court held that 
the right of supervision and control and not necessarily 
the degree to which the right was exercised was determinative 
Id. at 289, 508 P.2d at 807. See also Gallegos v. Stringham, 
supra. 
In proposition no. 1 the jury was asked to answer 
whether: 
"Ray Bethers had the right to supervise 
and control the activities of Clark Bambrough 
in relation to the loading of the trailer and 
the operation of the same at the time and 
place of the accident January 15, 1973." 
(R-29). 
The jury found proposition no. 1 to be true. (Id.). 
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The proposition as given comported with the 
language of Section 35-1-42(2). That section uses 
the term "over whose work he retains supervision and 
control." If, as appellant apparently concedes, Bethers 
had the right to supervise the loading of the cargo and 
operation of the trailer in his yard, (Appellants Brief 
p. 13), and if as plaintiff testified Leftwich told him 
to "If that's their procedure you do it", it would appear 
that Bethers had rights of both supervision and control 
over plaintiff. 
Appellant refers to no Utah cases for its 
assertion that the general employer must fully and completely 
release control before his employees can be employees of 
another for Workmen's Compensation purposes. The Kiewit, 
supra, Smith, supra and Peterson, supra, decisions of this 
court seem to indicate a clear policy in this state that a 
person can be paid, hired and on the job for one employer, 
yet be an employee of another for Workmens Compensation 
purposes if the latter employer retains the right to 
supervise and control the worker's activities at the time 
of the injury* 
There was evidence to support the finding that 
the respondent Bethers had supervision and control over 
appellant's working actions. Proposition no. 1 properly set 
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forth the essential factual matters relevant to employees 
for Workmens Compensation purposes. The judgment of 
dismissal based on the jury answer to proposition no. 1 
should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN: 
1) RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE DOCUMENTS 1-D, 
8-D AND 9-D; 
2) RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE DOCUMENTS 2-D, 
3-D AND 4-D; 
3) FAILING TO GIVE CERTAIN OF PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS: 
4)) SUBMITTING PROPOSITIONS 2 AND 3 OF THE 
SPECIAL VERDICT TO THE JURY. 
1. The trial court did not err in receiving 
into evidence Exhibit 1-D (Trip Lease dated September 7, 
1972), and Exhibits 8-D and 9-D (Driver's Dailey Logs for 
Septmeber 7 and 8, 1972) . 
At trial plaintiff objected to the receipt in 
evidence of Exhibit 1-D, a trip lease dated September 7, 
1972. That objection was based on the document's lack of 
relevance since it predated the accident in question by approx-
imately four months (R-269). Although plaintiff denied the 
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genuiness of his signature, the defendant Bethers 
identified his own signature on that document (R-265)• There 
was some indication that plaintiff's purported signature 
on the document 1-D was written in by D & L personnel 
because plaintiff had not properly turned in his paperwork 
(R-320). 
In any event, Section 78-25-9(3) of the Utah 
Code Annotated provides that a writing may be proved by its 
subscribing witness. Since Bethers signed the document 
and identified his signature, a foundation for admission 
of the document was established• Respondent contends 
the document was relevant, first, because it tended to 
evidence a course of prior lease dealings between Bethers 
and D & L, and second, because it reflected on plaintiff's 
ability to recall. Plaintiff testified he had no recol-
lection of a trip lease on the September, 1972 load he 
picked up at Bethers (R-297). 
The relevance of Exhibit 1-D was buttressed by 
documents 8-D and 9-D, which were apparent driver daily 
logs prepared by plaintiff and which specifically referred 
to an "RB lease". Plaintiff admitted that his signature 
on those logs was genuine (R-323). Those documents, are 
also relevant to show prior dealings between D & L and Bethers. 
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They also were relevant to show plaintiff's prior dealings 
with Bethers and tended to be some evidence of his ability 
to recall. 
2. The trial court did not err in recieving into 
evidence documents 2-D (Yellow Copy), 3-D (White Copy and 
4-D (Pint Copy) of the Trip Lease document dated January 
15, 1973. 
At trial defendants offered in evidence triplicate 
copies of a trip lease dated January 15, 1973. Clair 
Anderson, Bethers then dispatcher, testified he prepared 
a portion of the lease and signed it in two places on 
January 15, 1973. (R-211-213). There was one signature 
of Anderson added to the lease documents in late 1974 or 
early 1975, after the lawsuit had been filed (R-213-214). 
The lease documents were also signed by Bud Jolley, the 
replacement driver who delivered the load plaintiff would 
have had he not been injured (R-233, 246-248). The lease 
documents applied to the delivery plaintiff was supposed 
to have made. (R-233-234). 
The trial court deceived Exhibits 2-D, 3-D and 4-D 
into evidence, but only for the limited purpose of showing 
dates of and parties to the lease (R-321-322). The 
printed terms and conditions of the lease were not to be 
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considered by the jury (Id,). 
Respondents contend the admitted documents were 
relevant to the limited purposes for which they were 
received. Testimony at trial dealt with dates, parties to 
and signatures on the lease. Bambrough's claimed lack of 
knowledge of the lease,,would not bind D & L, since its 
replacement driver admitted he signed the document. The 
trial court had a reasonable basis to conclude the 
documents were relevant to the purposes for which they were 
received. The documents were supported by a foundation 
justifying their admission. Respondent also questions whether 
the receipt of the documents for the limited purposes 
permitted by the trial court had any substantial effect on 
the jury's finding or the cburt's judgment. Rule 4(b) Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
3. The trial court did not err in refusing to 
give certain of the instructions plaintiff requested. 
The plaintiff-appellant objected to the trial 
court's refusal to give seven (7) of the instructions 
plaintiff requested. Respondent contends the trial court 
did not err in refusing to give those instructions. 
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In Instruction No, 2 plaintiff asked the court 
to instruct the jury that before Bethers could transport 
equipment, the lease needed to contain certain items, 
including a 30 day minimum time as per ICC regulations 
which plaintiff claims apply. However, Bethers and D & L 
compliance or lack of compliance with ICC regulations, 
would not create or preclude a lease arrangement binding 
between them. The status of the contract between Bethers 
and D & L for Workmens Compensation purposes is a matter 
of state, and not federal administrative, law. Insofar 
as Bethers and D & L were concerned, and particularly 
for State Workmen's Compensation purposes, federal admin-
istrative law should not affect the essential validity 
of their contract with each other. 
Plaintiff also claims the trial court erred in 
refusing to instruct that: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
An employee is one who is hired and paid a 
salary, a wage, or at a fixed rate, to perform 
the employer's work as directed by the employer 
and who is subject to a comparatively high 
degree of control in performing those duties. 
Respondent contends that for the court to have 
given such an instruction would have been improper, since 
for Workmens Compensation purposes a worker can be paid 
and hired by a subcontractor, but still be an employee of 
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the general contractor. Utah Code Annotated 35-1-42; 
Kiewit, supra; Brown, supra. Also the proposed instruction 
failed to indicate that for Workmens Compensation purposes 
the right to control, whether exercised or not, is the 
material element, Parkinson, supra; Gallagos, supra. 
Appellant also asked the court to instruct that: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
The relation of employer and employee, for 
Workmen's Compensation purposes, cannot 
exist between the Defendant Ray Bethers 
and a loaned employee such as the Plaintiff 
Clark Bambrough, without the following being 
present: 
(a) Consent on the part of Plaintiff 
to work for the Defendant Ray Bethers; 
(b) Actual entry by the Plaintiff upon 
the work of and for the Defendant Ray Bethers, 
pursuant to a contract so to do; 
(c) Power of the Defendant Ray Bethers 
to control the details of the work to be 
performed and to determine how the work shall 
be done and whether it shall stop or continue. 
Respondents contend this proposed instruction was 
properly not given since it concludes as a matter of law 
that plaintiff could not be an employee for Workmens 
Compensation purposes unless he consented to be an employee 
of Bethers and there was a contract between them. Section 
35-1-42(2) does not require consent of the employee and neither 
do decisions of this court. Brown, supra, Kiewit, supra. 
-25-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Indeed, decisions of this court clearly indicate there 
need not be a contract between the general contractor and 
employees hired and paid by a subcontractor to make those 
persons employees of the general contractor for Workmens 
Compensation purposes * Brown, supra; Kiewit, supra; 
Peterson, supra. 
Appellant also contends the court committed 
error in failing to give these two instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
For Workmens Compensation purposes, an 
employee cannot have an employer thrust 
upon him against his will or without his 
knowledge. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
"Control" must be authoritative direction 
and control, not mere suggestions as to 
details or necessary cooperation. 
For reasons heretofore cited Respondents contend 
these requested instructions did not comport with the 
statutes concerning and decisions of this court interpreting 
the Workmens Compensation law of this state. 
Finally, plaintiff assigns as error the refusal 
of the court to give these instructions 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
Control, or lack of control, of the employee, 
while of the greatest significance, is not 
conclusive. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
The mere fact that Plaintiff's regular 
employer, D & L Corporation, permits some 
division of control does not give rise to 
the inference that he has surrendered control. 
With respect to proposed instruction no. 7 the 
plain language of Section 35-1-42(2) speaks against the 
proposition plaintiff requested the court give. 
And no Utah cases counsel for defendants have been* 
able to locate supports requested instruction 8's language. 
Indeed, the factual holding of this court's decisions in 
Okland, supra, Smith, supra seems to suggest that the law 
in this state is contrary to the propositions outlined in 
Instruction no. 8. 
4. The trial court did not commit the error 
appellant claims it did in submitting propositions 2 and 
3 to the jury on the special verdict. 
Appellant claims it was error for the court not 
to include in propositions 2 and 3 whether plaintiff was 
working for defendant Bethers or D & L Corporation. However, 
in both propositions the jury was asked about plaintiff's 
actions "for and on behalf of Ray Bethers Trucking Company." 
For Workmens Compensation purposes the material consideration 
was Bethers right to control plaintiff, not who hired plaintiff, 
who paid him, and who plaintiff thought his employer was. 
In any event, the jury after having heard all the testimony 
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i 
concluded in sufficient number that both propositions 
could be found true. Since there was ample evidence to 
support those propositions they should be allowed to 
remain undisturbed• 
CONCLUSIONS 
Of central importance is the fact that plaintiff 
failed to object to the submission of proposition no. 4 
i 
to the jury, which proposition set forth the factual test for 
"same employment" within the meaning of Section 35-1-62 as 
it read at the time of plaintiff's injury. The jury found 
those facts to be true, and those findings, by themselves, 
constitute an independent basis for sustaining the lower 
court judgment. 
With respect to the disputed question at the time 
of the accident of whether appellant was an employee of the 
defendant Bethers, the jury appears to have been persuaded 
that Bethers did have the crucial right to control Bambrough's 
working actions at the time the injury occurred. 
It is respectfully submitted that the facts found 
by the jury supported the trial court's dismissal of this 
action and are consistent with numerous Workmens Compensation 
decisions of this court• 
The objections to the admission of the documents 
and the failure to give the instructions plaintiff wished, do not, 
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in respeondents' opinion, constitute grounds for 
reversing the lower court judgment or having this matter, 
once fully considered by the jury,retried. 
The lower court judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
rkmt 
\J James 
liLiktL-
James L. Wilde 
Attorneys for the defendants and 
respondents 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served three copies of the fore-
going Respondent's Brief, by mailing the same, postage 
prepaid, to Richard W. Perkins, Attorney for plaintiff-
appellant, at Valley Professional Plaza, 2525 South Main 
Street, Suite 14, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, this St 
day o f /ftAflCtt 1 9 76. 
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